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Abstract. In this paper, we introduce Attribute-Based Signatures with
User-Controlled Linkability (ABS-UCL). Attribute-based signatures al-
low a signer who has enough credentials/attributes to anonymously sign
a message w.r.t. some public policy revealing neither the attributes used
nor his identity. User-controlled linkability is a new feature which allows a
user to make some of his signatures directed at the same recipient linkable
while still retaining anonymity. Such a feature is useful for many real-
life applications. We give a general framework for constructing ABS-UCL
and present an efficient instantiation of the construction that supports
multiple attribute authorities.
Keywords. Attribute-based signatures, security definitions, user-controlled
linkability.
1 Introduction
Attribute-based cryptography can play a tremendous role in providing
security to cloud computing, whether for privacy/access control (encryp-
tion) or for authentication (signatures). Attribute-based encryption [21,
35] is a natural generalization of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) [34,
9, 13] and its subsequent fuzzy variant [35] in the sense that it enables
fine-grained control of access to encrypted data.
Attribute-Based Signatures (ABS) [27] allow a signer owning a set of
attributes to sign messages w.r.t. any public access policy satisfied by his
attributes revealing neither his identity nor the set of attributes used in
the signing. Attribute-based signatures proved to be a powerful primitive
and many existing signature-related notions such as ring signatures [33]
and group signatures [10] could be viewed as special cases of attribute-
based signatures. For a comparison with other primitives, we refer to
[30]. The authors in [30] also showed many application of ABS including
attribute-based messaging [8], trust negotiation [17] and leaking secrets.
Some constructions of ABS consider multiple authorities while oth-
ers only support a single attribute authority. Okamoto et al. [32] and
El Kaafarani et al. [14] provide the first schemes working in a decen-
tralized fashion, where multiple attribute authorities are involved in the
scheme, with no reliance on a central authority. To add accountability
to attribute-based signatures, [25, 15, 14, 20] grant a designated tracing
authority the power to revoke anonymity and reveal the identity of the
signer in the case of a dispute. [20] strengthen the security notions of [14]
but at the expense of having a public key infrastructure. Direct Anony-
mous Attestation (DAA) [5, 3] adds a new interesting feature, namely,
the user-controlled linkability (UCL). This is a lightweight solution that
avoids having a designated tracing authority, which had previously rep-
resented a bottleneck to users’ privacy. In addition, it allows the user to
opt to make some of his signatures directed at the same verifier linkable
without sacrificing anonymity. Unlike the reliance on tracing authorities,
which are generally thought of as “for trouble-shooting”, UCL is intended
to be built into normal use. For example, in the world of attributes, as-
sume that a signer wants to establish a session (in a analogous way to the
idea of cookies) with a recipient and maintain this session in a convincing
way that he is indeed the same person whom the recipient is communicat-
ing with, not someone else who also has enough credentials to satisfy the
same policy in question; the tracing authority cannot help here, whereas
user-controlled linkability is an ideal functionality for such a scenario.
Existing ABS schemes differ from each other by the expressiveness of
the policies they support. For instance, we have constructions support-
ing non-monotonic policies, e.g. [31, 15], and those supporting monotonic
policies, e.g. [30], both with signatures’ size linear in the length of the pol-
icy. There are also constructions supporting threshold policies, e.g. [36,
26, 23, 18], where some of them yield constant-size signatures.
Contribution. We provide security definitions and a general framework
for constructing attribute-based signatures with user-controlled linkabil-
ity. Instantiations of the tools used in our generic construction exist in
both the random oracle [1] and the standard models. For efficiency rea-
sons, we provide an instantiation in the random oracle model.
Paper Organization. In Section 2, we define the notion of ABS-UCL,
giving its syntax along with the security definitions. In Section 3, we give
the cryptographic building blocks needed for ABS-UCL. We present our
general framework in Section 4, whereas in Section 5, we give a concrete
construction of ABS-UCL along with the security analysis. We conclude
the paper by comparing our notion to other notions in Section 6.
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2 Definition and Security of ABS-UCL
In this section, we define the notion of Attribute-Based Signatures with
User-Controlled Linkability (ABS-UCL), and present its security require-
ments. Our notion supports multiple attribute authorities, each respon-
sible for a subset of attributes.
2.1 Syntax of ABS-UCL
In an ABS-UCL scheme, we have a set AA = {AAi}ni=1 of attribute au-
thorities, where Ai is the space of attributes managed by attribute au-
thority AAi. The universe of attributes is defined as A =
⋃n
i=1Ai. Assume
that A ⊂ A is a set of attributes for which a certain predicate Ω is sat-
isfied, i.e. Ω(A) = 1. We have, a ∈ A ⇒ ∃Ai, s.t. a ∈ Ai, so attribute a
is managed by attribute authority AAi. Below are the definitions of the
algorithms used in an ABS-UCL scheme, where all algorithms (bar the
first three) take as implicit input pp produced by Setup.
• Setup(1λ): On input a security parameter, it returns public parameters
pp.
• AASetup(aid, pp): Is run locally by attribute authority AAaid to gen-
erate its public/secret key pair (vkAA, skAA). The authority publishes
vkAA and keeps skAA secret.
• UKeyGen(id, pp): Is run by user id to generate his personal secret key
skid.
• AttKeyGen(id, f(skid), a, skAA): Is run by attribute authority AA that
is responsible for the attribute a, where f is an injective one-way
function, it gives the user id the secret key skid,a, bound to his identity
id and f(skid).
• Sign(m,Ω, skid, skid,A, recip): If a user has enough attributes to sat-
isfy the predicate Ω, i.e. Ω(A) = 1, then he uses the correspond-
ing secrets keys skid,A = {skid,ai}ai∈A to produce a valid signature
σ = {σABS, σUCL} on the message m and the recipient tag recip w.r.t.
the predicate Ω; if recip = ⊥ then σUCL =⊥.
• Verify(σ, {vkAAi}i, Ω,m, recip): Takes a signature σ on the message
m and the possibly empty recipient tag recip w.r.t. a predicate Ω,
the verification keys {vkAAi}i of the attribute authorities managing
attributes involved in Ω, and returns 1 if the signature is valid, and 0
otherwise.
• Link(σ0,m0, {vkAAi}i, Ω0, σ1,m1, {vkAAj}j , Ω1, recip): On input two sig-
natures, two messages, two signing policies and the verification keys of
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the attribute authorities managing the attributes involved in the poli-
cies, and a recipient tag, it returns 1 if the signatures are valid on their
respective messages and the same non-empty recipient tag recip (w.r.t.
the respective policy), i.e. if recip 6=⊥ and (σUCL0 = σUCL1 6= ⊥), and
0 otherwise.
• Identify(σ,m, recip, {vkAAi}i, Ω, sk): Is only used in the security model
for capturing linkability. It checks whether the valid signature σ (w.r.t.
the signing policy Ω) on the message m and the non-empty recipient
tag recip was produced by the secret key sk, outputting 0/1 accord-
ingly.
2.2 Security Definitions
We define here the security requirements of an ABS-UCL scheme.
Correctness. This requires that signatures produced by honest users
verify correctly and that signatures produced by the same user to the
same valid recipient (i.e. on the same non-empty recipient tag) link.
Linkability. As specified in [37], there are two methods to support user-
controlled linkability in anonymous digital signatures: In the first, a des-
ignated linking authority can determine whether or not two signatures
are linked; whereas in the second method, there exists a public link-
ing algorithm which can be run by any party. Our model supports the
latter. We require that only valid signatures directed at the same re-
cipient and which were produced by the same user link. In the game
the adversary can choose all the secret keys of the users and attribute
authorities. The adversary outputs (σ1, recip1,m1, {vkAAi}i, Ω1, sk1) and
(σ2, recip2,m2, {vkAAj}j , Ω2, sk2). It wins if σi is valid (w.r.t. Ωi) on mi
and recipi, for i = 1, 2 and either of the following holds:
• σ1 was produced by sk1 and σ2 was produced by sk2 where sk1 =
sk2 and recip = recip1 = recip2 6=⊥ but Link(σ1,m1, {vkAAi}i, Ω1, σ2,
m2, {vkAAj}j , Ω2, recip) = 0.
• σ1 was produced by sk1 and σ2 was produced by sk2 where sk1 = sk2
and Link(σ1,m1, {vkAAi}i, Ω1, σ2,m2, {vkAAj}j , Ω2, recipk) = 1 for k ∈
{1, 2} and either recipk =⊥ or recip1 6= recip2.
• σ1 was produced by sk1 and σ2 was produced by sk2 where sk1 6= sk2
and recip = recip1 = recip2 6=⊥ and Link(σ1,m1, {vkAAi}i, Ω1, σ2,m2,
{vkAAj}j , Ω2, recip) = 1.
In summary, this requires that signatures by the same user on the
same non-empty recipient tag link. Also, signatures by different users but
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on the same recipient tag or those by the same user but on different
recipient tags do not link.
Anonymity. This requires that a signature reveals neither the identity
of the signer nor the attributes used in the signing. In the anonymity
game, we have the following:
• Adversary’s Capabilities: Full control over all attribute authorities. It
can also ask for the secret keys of signers of its choice; those signers
will be referred to as corrupt users. In addition, the adversary can ask
for the secret key of any attribute and has a signing oracle that it can
query on messages and recipient tags on behalf of honest users.
• Adversary’s Challenge: The adversary outputs (m, id0,A0, id1,A1, Ω,
recip) where Ω(Ai) = 1 for i = 0, 1. If recip 6=⊥ then we require that
throughout the game (i.e. even after the challenge phase) id0 and id1
must be honest (i.e. their personal secret keys are not revealed to the
adversary), and that neither of (id0, recip), (id1, recip) is queried to the
signing oracle. This ensures that the adversary cannot trivially win
by exploiting the linkability feature.
The adversary gets back a signature σb produced using (idb,Ab) for
b← {0, 1}. After this, the adversary can continue accessing its oracles
as long as it does not violate the above two conditions.
• Adversary’s Output: The adversary outputs its guess b∗ and wins if
b∗ = b.
Unforgeability. This requires that users cannot output signatures on
(message, recipient tag) pairs w.r.t. to a signing policy not satisfied by
their set of attributes, even if they pool their attributes together, which
ensures collusion-resistance. In addition, since our notion supports user-
controlled linkability, we additionally require that an adversary cannot
produce signatures which link to other signatures by an honest user, i.e.
one whose personal secret key has not been revealed to the adversary,
even if all other users and attribute authorities in the system are corrupt.
Note that, unlike in DAA, e.g. [2, 3], in our notion even if a user’s personal
secret key is revealed, only signatures on non-empty recipient tags by the
user can be traced, i.e. it is impossible to trace signatures on empty
recipient tags.
In the unforgeability game, we have the following:
• Adversary’s Capabilities: Access to a signing oracle. Moreover, it can
corrupt any attribute authority. We refer to the non-corrupted at-
tribute authorities as honest ones. It can also ask for the personal
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secret key of any user. We refer to the non-corrupted users as honest
ones. It can also ask for the secret key for any attribute.
• Winning Conditions: The adversary wins if either:
◦ Adversary outputs a valid signature σ on m and recip w.r.t. Ω,
where (m, recip, Ω) was not queried to the signing oracle, and there
exists no subset of attributes A∗ whose keys have been revealed
to the adversary or managed by corrupt attribute authorities s.t.
Ω(A∗) = 1. In other words, ∀A∗ s.t. Ω(A∗) = 1, ∃a∗ ∈ A∗ s.t.
Ω(A∗ \ {a∗}) = 0 and a∗’s key has never been revealed to the
adversary and it is managed by an honest attribute authority.
◦ Adversary outputs a tuple (m0, σ0, {vkAAi}i, Ω0,m1, σ1, {vkAAj}j ,
Ω1, recip 6=⊥, id), where σ0 is valid on m0 and recip w.r.t. Ω0, σ1 is
valid on m1 and recip w.r.t. Ω1, user id is honest, Link(σ0,m0,
{vkAAi}i, Ω0, σ1,m1, {vkAAj}j , Ω1, recip) = 1 and either (id,m0,
recip, Ω0) or (id,m1, recip, Ω1) was not queried to the signing ora-
cle.
Note here the adversary has more freedom than it has in the
anonymity game because it is allowed to ask for signatures by
the honest user it intends to frame on any recipient tag.
3 Building Blocks
Bilinear Groups. A bilinear group is a tuple P = (G1,G2,GT , p, g1, g2, e)
where G1,G2 and GT are groups of a prime order p and g1 and g2 generate
G1 and G2, respectively. The function e is a non-degenerate bilinear map
G1 × G2 −→ GT . According to [19], prime-order bilinear groups can be
categorized into three main types. We will use Type-3 where G1 6= G2 and
no efficiently computable isomorphisms between G1 and G2 are known.
This type is considered to be more efficient than Type-2, and definitely
more efficient than Type-1, when the latter is implemented over fields of
large prime characteristic.4
Digital Signatures. We require a Digital Signature (DS) scheme that
is correct and existentially unforgeable. In our construction realised in
the ROM, we will use different variants of the full Boneh-Boyen signa-
ture scheme [6]. We refer to original full Boneh-Boyen scheme as the BB
scheme, whereas we refer to its modified variant originally defined in [6],
4 One can implement Type-1 using supersingular curves over fields of small charac-
teristics (2 or 3), however recent records on solving DLog in these fields [22], with
the help of the MOV attack [28], ring a warning bell to avoid using Type-1 pairings
in new cryptographic applications.
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and used in, e.g. [12], as the BB† scheme. Both schemes are secure under
the q-SDH assumption.
Let P = (G1,G2,GT , p, g1, g2, e) be the description of a bilinear group
and h1 ∈ G1 is a random element. The schemes are described below:
• KeyGen(P): Choose x, y ← Zp, set (X,Y ) = (gx2 , gy2). The secret key
is (x, y) and the verification key is (X,Y ).
• BB.Sign(sk,m): To sign m ∈ Zp, choose r ← Zp such that x+ry+m 6=
0 and compute the signature σ = g
1/(x+ry+m)
1 . In the BB† scheme, the
signature is σ = (g1 · hz1)1/(x+ry+m), where the BB† signer need not
know the value z.
• Verify(vk,m, σ): if e(σ,X · Y r · gm2 ) = e(g1, g2) output 1, otherwise 0.
In the BB† scheme, the verification equation is e(σ,X · Y r · gm2 ) =
e(g1 · hz1, g2)
Linkable Indistinguishable Tags. A Linkable Indistinguishable Tag
(LIT) scheme [3] is similar to a Message Authentication Code (MAC) but
requires different security properties. It consists of a couple of algorithms
KeyGen and Tag. The former, on input a security parameter, produces a
secret key sk, whereas the latter, on input a message m and the secret
key, outputs a tag.
Besides correctness, the security of LIT [3] requires Linkability and f -
Indistinguishability. Linkability requires that an adversary who is allowed
to control both the secret key and the message cannot produce equal tags
unless they are tags on the same message/key pair. Indistinguishability,
which is defined w.r.t. a one-way function f of the secret key, requires that
an adversary who gets f(sk) and access to a tag oracle, cannot determine
whether or not a new tag on a message of its choice was produced using
the same key used by the tag oracle.
As in [3], we instantiate the LIT in the ROM with the Boneh-Lynn-
Shacham (BLS) signature scheme [7]. The LIT instantiation is secure
under the DDH and the discrete logarithm problems [3].
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs. Let R be an NP relation
on pairs (x, y) with a corresponding language LR = {y | ∃ x s.t.(x, y) ∈
R}. A NIZK proof system Π for a relation R is a tuple of algorithms
(Setup,Prove,Verify,Extract, SimSetup, SimProve) defined as follows: Setup
outputs a reference string crs and an extraction key xk which allows
for witness extraction. On input (crs, x, y), Prove outputs a proof pi if
R(x, y) = 1. On input (crs, y, pi), Verify outputs 1 if pi is a valid proof
that y ∈ LR, and 0 otherwise. Extract outputs the witness x from a valid
proof pi. Finally, SimSetup outputs a simulated reference string crssim and
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a trapdoor tr, which is used by SimProve to simulate proofs without a
witness.
We require: completeness, soundness and zero-knowledge. Complete-
ness requires that honestly generated proofs are accepted; Soundness re-
quires that it is infeasible to produce a convincing proof for a false state-
ment; Zero-knowledge requires that a proof reveals no information about
the witness used. For formal definitions refer to [4].
In our construction in the random oracle model, we use the Fiat–
Shamir transformation [16] applied to interactive Σ-protocols.
Span Programs. A span program [24] is defined as follows:
Definition 1. Given a monotone boolean function Φ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1},
a l×t matrix M with entries in a field F, and a labelling function a : [l]→
[n] that associates M ’s rows to Φ’s input variables. We say that M is a
monotone span program for φ over a field F if for every (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
{0, 1}n, we have the following:
[Φ(x1, . . . , xn) = 1]⇔[∃v ∈ F1×t : v ·M = [1, 0, 0, · · · , 0]
∧ (∀i : xa(i) = 0⇒ vi = 0)]
4 Framework for ABS with User-Controlled Linkability
Overview of the Framework.The tools we use in our generic construc-
tion are: a NIZK system Π that is sound and zero-knowledge, two exis-
tentially unforgeable signature schemes DS1 and DS2, a collision-resistant
hash function H and a f -indistinguishable linkable indistinguishable tag
scheme LIT. The Setup algorithm of ABS-UCL generates the common
reference string crs for the NIZK system Π. It also generates a key pair
(vkpsdo, skpsdo) for the digital signature schemes DS2. The public parame-
ters of the system is set to pp = (crs, vkpsdo,A,H), where A is the universe
of attributes. For a new attribute authority to join the system, it creates
a secret/verification key pair (skaid, vkaid) for signature scheme DS1. To
generate a signing key for attribute a ∈ A for signer id, the managing at-
tribute authority signs the signer identity along with the attribute and the
image of the one-way function on his secret key, i.e. (id,a, f(skid)), using
skaid. The resulting signature is used as the secret key for that attribute
by signer id.
To sign a message m w.r.t. a signing policy Ω, there are two cases;
if the signature is linkable (i.e. on a non-empty recipient tag recip 6=⊥),
the signer first uses LIT and his secret key to compute a tag σUCL on the
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recipient name recip and a NIZK proof pi that such a tag verifies w.r.t.
his personal secret key skid, and that he either has a digital signature on
a pseudo-attribute (following [30, 14]), i.e. the hash of the combination
of the signing predicate, the message and the recipient name recip, i.e.
apsdo = H(Ω,m, recip), that verifies w.r.t. the verification key vkpsdo or
that she has enough credentials (DS1 signatures on (id, f(skid), ai)) to
satisfy the original signing predicate Ω. For non-linkable signatures (i.e.
when recip =⊥), it suffices to produce a NIZK proof that the signer has
enough attributes to satisfy the modified predicate, i.e Ωˆ = Ω ∨ apsdo,
and therefore, no need for the linking part that uses LIT. Note that in
this case apsdo = H(Ω,m).
Before we define the languages for the NIZK proofs L1 for linkable
and L2 for non-linkable signatures, we will generically define the format
of these languages, where the secret values, aka witnesses for proofs, are
underlined:
L :
{
(public values pv), (witness w) : Ri(pv,w)
}
• Linkable signatures (recip 6= ⊥):
L1 :
{(
(vk = {vki}|Ωˆ|i=1,a = {ai}|Ωˆ|i=1), (skid, id,v,σ = {σai}|Ωˆ|i=1)
)
:
(
vM = [1, 0, . . . , 0]
) |Ωˆ|−1∧
i=1
(
vi = 0 ∨ DS1.Verify(vki, id, skid, ai, σai) = 1
)
∧(
v|Ψˆ | = 0 ∨ DS2.Verify(vkpsdo, apsdo, σapsdo) = 1
)
∧(
LIT.Tag(skid, recip) = σUCL
}
·
• Non-Linkable signatures (recip = ⊥):
L2 :
{(
(vk = {vki}|Ωˆ|i=1,a = {ai}|Ωˆ|i=1), (skid, id,v,σ = {σai}|Ωˆ|i=1)
)
:
(
vM = [1, 0, . . . , 0]
) |Ωˆ|−1∧
i=1
(
vi = 0 ∨ DS1.Verify(vki, id, skid, ai, σai) = 1
)
∧(
v|Ψˆ | = 0 ∨ DS2.Verify(vkpsdo, apsdo, σapsdo) = 1
)
We use a span program (Section 3) to prove the satisfiability of the
extended predicate Ωˆ. Using a public matrix M, the signer needs to prove
the ownership of a secret vector v ∈ Z|Ωˆ|p for which vM = [1, 0, . . . , 0].
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The zero elements in this vector v corresponds to attributes that the
signer does not actually need in order to satisfy the predicate. For these
values, the signer can safely choose random signatures. For the non-zero
elements in v, the signer needs to prove ownership of their corresponding
attributes/pseudo-attribute.
The hiding property of the Π system ensures that the proof pi does
not reveal how the modified predicate Ωˆ was satisfied.
The pseudo-attribute is used for two reasons; firstly, it binds the sig-
nature to the message, the signing predicate, and the recipient name recip
if the the signature is linkable. Secondly, the secret signing key skpsdo for
the digital signature scheme DS will be used as a trapdoor in the security
proofs to allow its holder to simulate signatures and sign on behalf of any
signer without knowing their secret keys. That could be done by produc-
ing a signature on the pseudo-attribute associated with the message and
the signing predicate.
The full proof for the following Theorem is in the full version.
Theorem 1. The generic construction of the attribute-based signature
with user-controlled linkability ABS-UCL given above is secure if the un-
derlying building blocks are secure.
5 A Concrete Construction of ABS-UCL
Description of the Construction. The signer’s task is to provide a
zero-knowledge proof of knowledge pi w.r.t. the languages defined earlier,
i.e. L1 and L2, depending on whether or not the signature is linkable.
We instantiate DS1 using the BB† scheme and DS2 using the BB scheme.
The proof will be made of 3 parts (or 2 if non-linkable). The first deals
with the Span program to show how to hide which subset of attributes
the signer has used to satisfy the modified predicate Ωˆ. For this, the
signer proves that he has used a secret vector v to span the public matrix
M ∈ Zα×θp of the span program, where α = |Ωˆ|. The second part is to show
that the signatures verify correctly w.r.t. their corresponding verification
keys, where the span program can safely let the signer choose random
signatures for the attributes which he does not own/want to use. The
third part is to show that, when the signature is supposed to be linkable,
the linking part indeed uses the same user secret key used in the rest of
the proof. Not that the group elements used later in the commitments,
i.e. k1, k2 and k3 are parts of the public parameters pp whereas sk is the
signer’s secret key.
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Part 1: Span program
Prove that vM = [1, 0, . . . , 0], this can be done by proving the following:
|Ωˆ|∑
i=1
viMij =
{
1 j = 1
0 2 ≤ j ≤ θ (1)
• Commitments of vector v
◦ βvi , βti , ti ← Zp, i = 1 . . . α.
◦ Vi = gβvi1 · k
βti
3 ; vˆi = g
vi
1 · kti3
• Proof of Statement
◦ ∀j ∈ [1, θ] compute: Λj =
α∏
i=1
k
ti.Mij
3 ; λj =
α∏
i=1
(k
Mij
3 )
βti
Part 2: DS1 and DS2
Now each verification equation is as follows:
e(σai
vi , X · Y r · gai||id2 ) = e(g1, g2) · e(hsk1 , g2)
DS1 is instantiated using the BB† scheme whereas DS2 is instantiated
using the BB scheme. The signatures are as follows:
σai =
{
(g1 · hsk1 )1/(xi+yiri+ai||id) regular attributes
g
1/(xi+yiri+apsdo)
1 pseudo-attributes
Where the public keys of an attribute ai is the couple of group elements
Xi = g
xi
2 and Yi = g
yi
2 . The identity of the signer is id and his secret key
is sk. In order to use the secret vector v to hide the subset of attributes
used to satisfy the predicate Ω, we can simply raise each σai to its corre-
sponding vector value vi, when vi is zero, the signer does not want to this
attribute, and therefore he can replace the signature by a random value.
• Commitments of (σai , ri), i ∈ [1, α] and the signer identity id:
Pick ρvi , ρid, ρri , ρsk, βρsk , βidρvi , βri , βρi , βid, βρri , βρid , βcs,← Zp, and com-
pute:
Ti = σai
vi · kρvi1 , Ki = Y ri · k2ρri , Z = hsk1 · kρsk1 U = g2id · k2ρid
Kˆi = Y
βri
i · k2βρri , Zˆ = hβsk1 · k
βρsk
1 , Uˆ = g2
βid · k2βρid
Let, ∀i ∈ [1, α− 1] : ρi = ρri + ρid whereas ρα = ρrα .
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• Simplification: (can be done by both prover and verifier)
X ′i = e(k1, Xi · gai·2
|id|
2 ) Y
′
i = e(k1, Yi) R = e(k1, g2)
T ′i = e(Ti, k2) D
′ = e(k1, G
apsdo
2 )
• Knowledge of Exponents
∀i ∈ [1, α] and ∀j ∈ [1, θ], compute:
X ′ij = (X ′iMij )βρvi Y ′ij = (Y ′i Mij )βriρvi T ′ij = (T ′iMij )βρi
∀i ∈ [1, α− 1], ∀j ∈ [1, θ], compute:
Rij = (RMij )βidρvi
∀j ∈ [1, θ]:
◦ D′αj = (M ′zαj )βρvi
◦ Pj = X ′αj · Y ′αj · T ′αj · D′αj
◦ Bj = Pj ·
α−1∏
i=1
X ′ij · Y ′ij · Rij · T ′ij
Part 3:Linkability- LIT
The signer needs to prove the following equation:
BLS.Sign(sk, recip) = σUCL
If the signature is linkable, then compute:
N = H(recip)βsk , L =
( h1
H(recip)
)βsk · kβρsk1 σUCL = H(recip)sk,
otherwise; σUCL = ⊥.
Finally, compute the challenge c:
c = HFS( N||L︸ ︷︷ ︸
if linkable
||λj ||Si||Ti||Ki||U ||Kˆi||Uˆ ||Bj ||Z),∀i ∈ [1, α],∀j ∈ [1, θ].
• Responses
◦ svi = βvi + cvi, sti = βti + cti, sid = βid + cid, ssk = βsk +
csk, sρsk = βρsk + cρsk, sρid = βρid + cρid
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◦ ∀i ∈ [1, α] :
sρvi = βρvi + cρvi , sriρvi = βriρvi + c(riρvi), sρi = βρi + cρi, sri =
βri + cri, sρri = βρri + cρri ;
◦ ∀i ∈ [1, α− 1], compute:
sidρvi = βidρvi + c(idρvi)
Let Σ = {sρvi , sriρvi , sidi , sρi , sri , sρri , sid, sρid , svi , sti , ssk, sρsk}, the signa-
ture is:
σABS−UCL = (Σ, c, {Λj}θ1, {vˆi, Ti,Ki}α1 , U, Z, σUCL)
Verification
Compute:
∆j = e(Tα, (Xα ·K1α ·Gapsdo2 )Mαj )
Ej =

∆1 ·
α−1∏
i=1
e(Ti, (Xi ·Ki · U)Mij )/e(g1, g2) · e(Z, g2) j = 1
∆j ·
α−1∏
i=1
e(Ti, (Xi ·Ki · U)Mij ) 2 ≤ j ≤ θ
• Uˆ = g2
sid · k2sρid · U−c, Zˆ = hssk1 · k
sρsk
1 · Z−c
• ∀i ∈ [1, α] :
Si = gsvi1 · k
sti
3 · vˆi−c Kˆi = Yisri · k2sρri ·Ki−c
• ∀j ∈ [1, θ]:
◦ λj = Λ
−c
j ·
∏α
i=1(k
Mij
3 )
sti
◦ Pj = (X ′Mαjα )sκα · (Y ′αMαj )srακα · (T ′αMαj )sρα · (D′Mαj )sκα
◦ Bj = Ej−c · Pj ·
α−1∏
i=1
(X ′Miji )
sρvi · (Y ′i Mij )sriρvi · (RMij )sidi · (T ′iMij )sρi
• For the linkablility:
◦ If σUCL 6= ⊥, then compute:
N = H(recip)ssk · (σUCL)−c, L =
( h1
H(recip)
)ssk · ksρsk1 · ( ZσUCL
)−c
• Let cˆ = HFS( N||L︸ ︷︷ ︸
if linkable
||λj ||Si||Ti||Ki||U ||Kˆi||Uˆ ||Bj ||Z),
• Verify that cˆ = c and that the following statement holds:
α∏
i=1
vˆi
Mij =
{
g1 · Λ1 j = 1
Λj 2 ≤ j ≤ θ
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Table 1. Existing ABS schemes and their features
Scheme Anonymity Traceability Decentralisation UCL
[14, 20] 3 3 3 8
[32] 3 8 3 8
[29] 3 8 8 8
Ours 3 8 3 3
The full proof for the following Theorem is in the full version.
Theorem 2. The construction is secure in the random oracle model if
the q-SDH, DDH and Dlog assumptions hold, and the hash function H is
collision resistant.
6 Comparison
In Table 1, we compare the properties offered by our notion with those
offered by related attribute-based signature notions. We note that the size
of the signature of our concrete construction, which uses Type-3 bilinear
groups is G2·|Ωˆ|+θ+21 +G
|Ωˆ|+1
2 +Z
8·|Ωˆ|+4
p , where θ is the number of columns
in the span program matrix M.
Our main concern in this paper was efficiency, hence the use of ran-
dom oracles. There are alternative building blocks in the literature to
instantiate ABS-UCL in the standard model.
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